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Abstract. The main aspects of the building process of the Euro-Mediterranean security 
system are assessed in this article with the tools of analysis of the regional security 
systems. The Mediterranean security project is also compared with other forms and 
cases of regional security system. The presence of other multilateral initiatives on 
Mediterranean security is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-
Mediterranean project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP 
and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the 
process for building the Mediterranean security system.    2
 
 
In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) approach, the construction of 
security co-operation in the Mediterranean region is the expected effect of two causes, 
i.e. the multidimensional strategy of the three Chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and 
the specific initiatives of the partners within the 1
st Chapter frame. For this reason, the 
Barcelona Declaration is the fundamental agreement of a regional security system that 
will produce full round security effects when the partner governments add to it new 
agreements that create the operative mechanisms and measures that set up a 
comprehensive and cooperative security system. Accordingly, one of the most 
important tasks ahead in carrying out the Mediterranean security system is to restart and 
make progress in the negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability. In 
fact, official documents - as, for example, the European Commission’s EU Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Final Report, June 2004 - 
consider important the re-launching of the discussion on the draft of the Charter but 
“when the situation allows”. 
In this analysis, the building process of the Euro-Mediterranean security 
system is assessed by making use of the tools of analysis of regional security systems. 
In particular, the study of regional security partnerships I have been working at for the 
last years allows to put the study of the Mediterranean security project in comparative 
perspective. Profiting from such perspective and knowledge, the existence of different 
multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is pointed out as a strategic tool 
for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and the proposal for 
increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the 
table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security 
system. 
 
The forms of regional security systems 
In a recent study (Attinà, 2004), I propose to distinguish and order different 
forms of regional security system according to the level of institutionalization of 
security co-operation and social integration of the members. This order varies from 
zero-level, i.e. no agreement on co-operative measures of security, to the most   3
institutionalized structure of co-operation, i.e. the amalgamated security community 
defined by Karl Deutsch. The graphic representation of this classification is given in 
Fugure 1. 
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Leaving apart the left-hand extreme of the line, i.e. regions in which states 
refute to create stable security arrangements by explicit agreement because of current 
military confrontation like in the Middle East, in the left-hand part of the line the 
opposite alliance system is the main example of the concerted form of regional security. 
In this case, however, governments do not agree on any form of collective solution of 
security problems. Concert is only the tacit accord of the governments to keep on with 
the existing condition of (military) power equilibrium rather than negotiating for the 
building of a regional co-operative system. After World War Two, during forty years 
the European security system has been a system of opposite alliances, but on the early 
1970s it headed for a different arrangement that came into being in the very early 
Nineties, as it is explained later in this analysis. On current time, the Mediterranean 
region is free from the conditions for an opposite alliance system but is potentially open 
to such an occurrence. 
The system of collective security occupies the center of the line because with 
this arrangement, governments prefer to keep armed forces under strict national control 
and agree to make them available on request to intervene against the aggressor. At the   4
region level, as for example in Africa with the Organization of African Union, 
collective security did neither bring the constitution of permanent military forces nor the 
signature of agreements on obligatory co-operative measures for conflict management. 
In contemporary Europe, collective measures and the support of mechanisms for their 
effective implementation are the content of the security system created with the Helsinki 
Process and the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE), later changed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). However, these measures and mechanisms, associated with other 
instruments, created a different regional security arrangement which is better defined as 
regional security partnership. This system is later explained in this analysis. 
A security community, as initially theorized by Karl Deutsch, is a group of 
people that have become integrated and consider war as an obsolete instrument of 
conflict resolution (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is brought into being 
by the high level of transaction and communication flows that bind together a group of 
people who think of themselves as a community, and produce favourable conditions for 
the establishment of institutions of peaceful conflict resolution. Deutsch made a 
distinction between amalgamated security communities, which are formed by states that 
abandon unconditional sovereignty and merge into an expanded state, and pluralistic 
security communities in which states retain their legal independence but develop 
common institutions and a sense of “we-ness” and “we-feeling”. As Adler and Barnett 
remark (1998), pluralistic communities vary between two forms – i.e. the loosely and 
tightly coupled form - on whether they are close to persistent state sovereignty 
separation or emerging government centralization. Therefore, the right-hand part of the 
line of regional security systems is populated with three forms of arrangement. 
Amalgamated security communities coincide with federal states like the formation of 
Germany in the 19
th century demonstrates. Scandinavia, Canada and the United States, 
and the Euro-Atlantic community, instead, are examples of the loosely coupled form of 
pluralistic security community. Finally, the European Union is example of the tightly 
coupled form of security community, but the whole European continent is hardly a 
security community, and the wider Europe and its surrounding area is still far from 
qualify as a case of this arrangement. It fits, instead, into another form which is 
presented here below.   5
Regional security partnership is the arrangement based on the approach to 
international security that developed in Europe with the Helsinki Process (See, among 
others, Flynn and Farrell, 1999; Ghebali, 1989; Ghebali and Warner, 2001, Hopmann, 
2003). In this approach to security, all (or almost all) the states of a region and also 
extra-regional powers are partners in a single arrangement. Measures of cooperative 
security (like exchange of information on military policies and structures) and 
comprehensive security (i.e. the military and non-military aspects of security) are 
constitutive means of this security arrangement. In addition, partners make use of 
international and internal measures to improve the security of the region and preserve 
geopolitical stability. In contrast to security communities, security partnerships can be 
formed by groups of countries characterized by conflict divisions, irregular flows of 
transactions and communication, and a small sharing of values and institutions. These 
conditions apply to the whole group of the countries of the partnership, but some 
countries of the group are not divided by conflict lines, are linked by large flows of 
mutual transactions and communication, and share the same cultural and institutional 
values. In addition, the countries of the region have different security cultures but these 
are not so distant from one another as to prevent the formation of consensus on 
introducing cooperation on security problems. In other words, for some political and 
practical reasons, these countries are inclined to act together for the reduction of the risk 
of violent confrontation, and allow the flow of mutual communication and material 
transactions to increase on their own. In as much as security cooperation in a regional 
partnership becomes strong and durable over time, observance of common practices by 
the partner states produces common orientations towards problems and values and, 
consequently, reduces the partners’ security culture difference. On their turn, common 
practices and orientations lead to the formation of we-ness and common identities of the 
people of the partner states. Hence, it is possible that a regional security partnership 
turns into a security community.  
In conclusion, regional security partnership is the arrangement that 
originates from the consensus of the states of a region to cooperate on the reduction of 
violence and enhancement of stability and peace by making use of different types of 
agreements and mechanisms like formal security treaties, security international 
organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and   6
stability pacts consisting of confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy 
measures, and also measures for influencing the domestic structures and processes of 
the countries at risk of internal violence.  
A regional security partnership is based on a set of documents, i.e. one or 
few fundamental agreements, and a number of related operative agreements. In the 
fundamental agreement(s), shared principles of peaceful relations are proclaimed, 
commitment to avoid power confrontation is given, and sources of conflict, tension and 
instability are made public by the partner governments. Within the frame of the 
fundamental agreements, the regional states agree to establish also the operative 
agreements and mechanisms that are needed to implement co-operative measures for the 
management of the common security problems. With the operative agreements, the 
partner governments create multilateral offices and make use of existing and new 
created international organizations to deal with the perceived security threats. 
Multilateral offices and organizations are the most important collective instruments of 
the security partnership, especially in as much as they are responsible for peace-making 
and peace-keeping operations. In these conditions, a certain extent of defence de-
nationalization and, in the long-term, also the constitution of a security community can 
be expected as consequence of the establishment of a regional security partnership. 
The main attributes of the regional security partnership model are 
summarized as it follows. 
Pre-conditions 
•  awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local 
effects of global problems, 
•  relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region 
and restrained use of violence in international conflicts. 
Conditions 
•  consensus of the governments of the region on building security 
cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving 
international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic 
growth, 
•  no system of opposite military alliances. 
Structures and means 
•  written fundamental agreements, 
•  operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations, 
•  a set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict 
management and prevention, 
•  involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable).   7
Consequences 
•  reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the 
countries of the region, 
•  increase of defence de-nationalization, 
•  development of security community (possible). 
 
The partnership model is built on the observation of current processes aimed 
at changing the nature of security management in some regions of Europe and Asia. The 
construction of the European security system since the early Seventies, i.e. from the 
opening of the Helsinki Process, is the most important case of regional security 
partnership in international politics, but current initiatives in Asia – namely in the East 
Asia/Pacific (i.e. the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) and Central Asia (i.e. the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) – are examples of this form of regional 
security co-operation. 
The European security partnership arrangement developed after the 
launching of the Helsinki Process in the early 1970s and matured in the 1990s. It 
includes all the states of Europe, the non-European members of the OSCE (i.e. the 
United States and Canada) and the former Soviet Union countries of Southern Caucasus 
(Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). On the contrary, the five former Soviet countries of 
central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), 
which are formal members of OSCE, cannot be considered any more members of the 
European security system because their security policies are tightly linked to the Central 
Asia security complex. Indeed, at the exception of Turkmenistan, they are members of 
the Central Asia security partnership, which is presented later in this analysis. This 
condition signals the overlapping of regional security arrangement, which is worth of 
future analysis. 
The fundamental agreements of the European security partnership are the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe. Many 
operative agreements have been made within the Helsinki Process, which gave birth to 
the offices, mechanisms and activities of the CSCE/OCSE. The OSCE structure 
includes the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the office of the 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, and 18 Mission and other Field Activities in member countries. They have 
been added to a number of agreements signed by European governments during the past   8
fifty years. All these agreements are de facto complementary with the European 
partnership fundamental agreements (Attinà and Repucci, 2004). This is the case of 
NATO and NATO’s Eastern projection mechanisms known as the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the EU’s mechanism known as 
the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) created within the European security and defence 
policy (ESDP), and EU’s economic cooperation programs (like PHARE and Tacis). 
The European security partnership has been put to a test in various 
occasions during the Nineties, namely in former Soviet states and the Balkans. 
Performance has not been always good, sometimes deceptive. However, the role of the 
security mechanisms was important in several cases in which the direct intervention of 
peacekeeping forces helped to restrain violence, and the programmes of relief and 
rehabilitation helped to restore civilian conditions in countries ravaged by internal 
violence. As of today, OSCE displays a range of 18 field missions in member countries 
in need of assistance for security, political and economic problems. 
Since the last Nineties, the European security partnership is under the 
challenge of the current worldwide in-security environment. Accordingly, the European 
governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered 
by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger” (Krause and Latham, 1999: 39). 
To cope with the problem of containing the policies of governments which are 
perceived as aggressive, irrational and unreceptive of the cooperative mechanisms (like 
the Milosevic’s regime), and the problem of dealing with the threats of global terrorism, 
the European governments increased their concern for upgrading military preparedness. 
This policy change has many aspects including the development of the ESDP for 
worldwide use and, in some cases, the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic 
preponderance as condition for international stability and peace. 
The development of the Asia/Pacific security partnership is centred in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, also known as the ARF (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Kivimaki, 
2001; Narine, 2002). The membership of this initiative increased from initial 18 to 23 
countries including the United States and European Union. The fundamental agreement 
is the First ARF Chairman's Statement, issued in 1994. ARF objectives are to foster 
constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common 
interest, and make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive   9
diplomacy in the region. Despite its rather long life, ARF has been unable so far to 
develop operative agreements and create permanent offices for security issues. 
The summit meeting of five states (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan) in the Chinese city of Shanghai in April 1996 is the founding event of 
the Central Asia security partnership (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Zhang, 2001). The 
meeting launched the so-called Shanghai Five Initiative, which turned into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 15, 2001. On this occasion, the fundamental 
agreement of the Central Asia security partnership system was signed. After 
Uzbekistan’s admission in 2001, the SCO counts on six member states. Since the first 
summit meeting, a series of operative agreements have been concluded and practical 
measures have been agreed on to strengthen effective cooperation in various fields and 
mutual trust among member states. The “Agreement on Confidence-Building in the 
Military Field Along the Border Areas” and the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of 
Military Forces in the Border Areas”, signed in 1996 and 1997, are the first operative 
agreements aimed at implementing security partnership building among the five 
countries. Lastly, in January 2004, the SCO’s secretariat office was created in Beijing, 
and the SCO’s Antiterrorism Centre in Tashkent. Cracking down on international 
terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal migration and other forms of cross-
border crimes are perceived as the most urgent task of the Organisation. These measures 
are pertinent to the building of regional security cooperation, but the implementation of 
existing confidence-building measures and their development are still uncertain. 
However, taking into account the peculiarities of the region, this first step is recognized 
as the inception of the “Central-Asian way” of building a regional security partnership. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean project 
A Euro-Mediterranean project of security cooperation was implicitly 
launched in Barcelona in 1995 with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
agreement. But formal negotiation started in the late Nineties with the initiative for the 
Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability. 
The EMP approach to security is a multidimensional approach, as stated in 
the Barcelona Declaration which includes three Chapters on Politics and Security 
Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs, and Human, Social and Cultural Affairs   10
(Attinà, 2003; Philippart 2003). For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration has the 
nature of the fundamental agreement of a regional security partnership. It will have full 
effect only if and when the partner governments agreed on operative agreements to 
implement multilateral mechanisms and measures of cooperative security. The 
negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Stability and Peace was claimed to be the 
most important step towards introducing operative measures and mechanisms. The aim 
of the proposal of the Stability and Peace Charter for the Mediterranean was to obtain 
from all the Mediterranean governments the solemn commitment to work for political 
stability and abstein from war to solve conflicts and disputes over border and national 
issues. Agreement about starting negotiation at the level of Senior Officials and experts 
was reached on 1997, but very soon it was understood that the Mediterranean 
governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability. 
Discussions among experts continue to be held as of today by the EuroMeSCO network, 
but the Charter negotiation has been interrupted
1. 
By all means, the negotiation of the Charter has been confronted with many 
obstacles like the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process, the post-9/11 anti-
terrorism policies of the Western governments, and the Iraq and post-Iraqi war 
problems. All these events slowed down the partnership building process and, finally, 
made the Charter negotiation to be suspended for the time being. However, it is noted 
that the 9/11 events and the spread of global terrorism had the positive effect of 
reinforcing efforts to include co-operation on domestic security and police co-operation 
in the agenda of the Barcelona Process. At the same time, the true consequences of the 
Iraqi war are still unclear. Finally, the new EU “neighborhood policy” (ENP) may affect 
the Mediterranean security partnership building process, although in the above 
                                                 
1 On April 1999, the Stuttgart EMP Ministerial Conference made public the state of the Charter 
negotiation. In the Conclusions, Ministers welcomed the initiatives aimed at exchanging information on 
the signature and ratification of international instruments in the fields of disarmament and arms control, 
terrorism, human rights, and international humanitarian law; underlined the importance of developing 
measures  like the  establishment of a Euro-Med system of disaster prevention, mitigation and 
management; recognized that the Charter would be a political - and not a legal - document committing the 
partners to political dialogue and the evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building 
measures, good-neighborly relations, and preventive diplomacy; included the commitment to endow the 
Charter with the appropriate decision-making mechanisms to make all decisions by consensus. In the 
Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter, annexed to the Conference Conclusions, the 
EMP Group of Senior Officials was assigned the task of working out a comprehensive schedule of the 
negotiations in order to complete the elaboration of the Charter by the time of the successive Ministerial 
Conference. No real progress, however, has been made since Stuttgart.   11
mentioned document on the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, the European Union pledges to work for all the existing security 
commitments. 
The March 2003 Communication of the Commission on ENP names 
fourteen countries as neighbouring countries and partners to the project of creating a 
new framework of relations. They are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya and all 
the present members of the Barcelona Process (namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority) but Turkey because 
candidacy to EU makes this country not eligible to participate in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. In the July 2003 Communication on the Neighbourhood 
Instrument, also Rumania and Bulgaria, which are formal candidates, and the Balkan 
countries, which are prospective candidates, were associated to the ENP programmes. In 
addition, in the Solana document on A Secure Europe in a Better World, released in 
Brussels on December 12, 2003, the Southern Caucasus was included in the “ring” of 
special interest for the EU. In fact, in the European Commission’s Strategy Paper on the 
ENP (May 12, 2004) and the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 
(June 17-18, 2004), the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia have been added to the ENP partner countries, but Bulgaria and Rumania were 
not mentioned. Therefore, as of today, the ENP counts on 17 partners, i.e. the earliest 
fourteen countries and the three Southern Caucasian countries. 
The new policy plan is expressly aimed at developing a zone of prosperity 
and a 'ring of friends' with whom the EU can enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative 
relations. Political and economic interdependence is recognized as a reality that puts on 
the European Union the duty to creating an enlarged area of political stability and 
functioning rule of law. The European Union offers the prospect of a stake in the EU's 
internal market to those countries that make concrete progress demonstrating shared 
values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms.  
Neighbouring countries are invited to take political and legislative measures 
to enhance economic integration and liberalization, and measures to promote human 
rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Besides these measures, which 
are coherent with the European view of regional security, neighbouring countries are 
explicitly invited also to make steps towards regional security co-management and   12
participate in initiatives aimed at (a) improving conflict prevention and crisis 
management, and (b) strengthening co-operation to prevent and combat common 
security threats. In such a perspective, it is apparent that the Neighbourhood Policy 
approach to security consists of the classical concepts that distinguish the European 
regional security partnership of the last thirty years: i.e. the concepts of comprehensive 
security – as interdependence between the political, socio-economic, environmental, 
cultural and military dimensions - and cooperative security – as the constant exercise of 
dialogue and exchange of information, knowledge and expertise. 
In the security area, the European Union is firmly committed to the long-
range strategy of building security by improving the domestic conditions (both 
economic and political) of the neighbour and partner countries, and by furthering 
mutual confidence and understanding of the states. At the same time, to face the threats 
of trans-national crime and terrorism, it urges intense coordination and the use of new 
instruments. A Secure Europe in a Better World is, in a certain sense, the twin document 
for the political and security area of the neighbourhood policy as the July document on 
the Neighbourhood Instrument is in the economic and technical area. A Secure Europe 
in a Better World is a wide-range document that devotes special attention to relations 
with the neighbouring countries. In this regard, the message of the document is 
ambivalent in the sense that commitment to dialogue with the partners is sided with 
commitment to the full-round development of the military capabilities of the Union. In 
fact, this is an obligation of the Union since it committed itself to develop ESDP. 
Attention must be directed also to an important obstacle hindering 
negotiation in the Mediterranean region, i.e. the divide of security culture (Attinà, 
2001). The security policies and decisions of the states are intrinsically influenced by 
past experiences in security problems. More precisely, recent experiences and beliefs, 
traditions, attitudes and symbols are intimately related and add to one another in 
shaping the country’s security culture. This culture shapes the preference of national 
governments for certain security instruments (or combination of instruments) rather 
than others that are also available. However, culture is never static. Learning from 
recent experiences is responsible for culture change as it is interaction with the security 
culture of other states and regions as well as the influence of new ideas, practices and 
experiences.   13
The current security culture of the European countries is linked to three 
recent experiences: (1) the arms control negotiations of the Cold War and détente times; 
(2) the Helsinki Process with the three-decade long elaboration of new ideas and the 
formation of the mechanisms of comprehensive and cooperative security; and (3) the 
formulation of new defense policies in the 1990s to react to unexpected crises and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries and non-state actors 
insensitive of the conventional logic of military strategy. It is reasonable that the present 
double-sided form of the European security culture, which combines the concepts of co-
operative and comprehensive security with the discourse of the new threats and dangers, 
will last as long as an arms control culture does not gain again over the proliferation of 
WMD at the global level, and the regional security partnership model is firmly 
introduced in other regions of the world like the Mediterranean. 
The security culture of the contemporary Arab countries contains four 
distinct views. Two of them are based on long-time traditions. They are (1) the Arab 
nation view, which advocates for an Arab trans-state community as the building block 
of peace and security in the area, and (2) the view of the society of Arab states, which 
believes, instead, in friendly relations between the Arab states as the foundation of 
security in the Arab world and the condition for protecting the individual Arab country 
against external interference. In the 1990s, two views contrasting with the traditional 
views came to the front. (3) A reformist view developed, especially in North Africa, 
with great emphasis on civil society security, achievement of better conditions of life 
and the need for economic reforms in agreement with the traditions of the Arab culture 
and Islamic religion. (4) However, the largest critical movement against the status quo 
discourse of domestic politics is the fourth view of security, the Islamist view. It is 
constructed around a radical conception of the security needs of the Islamic countries 
and strong emphasis on religion and culture identity. Islamists’ concerns are the external 
threat of the non-Islamic world and the internal enemies of un-Islamic groups. Some 
Islamist movements engage in violent actions; others use non-violent means. All of 
them criticize the state for failing to meet the socio-economic needs of the society and 
the aspiration to turn down external influence and intervention.  
Security cooperation at the region level is unfamiliar to the Arab security 
culture. Building regional security through co-operative means creates strong suspicions   14
in governments attached to national military power and the traditional view of strategic 
secrecy. The Arab countries never practiced co-operative security mechanisms as the 
European countries have been doing since the Helsinki Process. Also comprehensive 
security is suspicious concept to Arab political elite and policy-makers. 
Finally, since the EMP security project is not the only multilateral initiative 
for building a new security arrangement in the Mediterranean, attention must be called 
on the need for enlarging the negotiating table of the Mediterranean security system. 
In 1994, OSCE decided to establish an informal contact group with experts 
from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of sharing 
information on confidence-building measures with the representatives
  of these 
countries. OCSE’s projection in the Mediterranean dates back to the early years of the 
Helsinki Process. On the assumption that security in Europe was closely linked with 
security in the Mediterranean and the process of improving security could not be 
confined to Europe but extended to other parts of the world, in particular to the 
Mediterranean area. A chapter on "Questions relating to security and co-operation in the 
Mediterranean" was included in the Helsinki Final Act (1975). Starting in 1995, annual 
seminars were organized by the OSCE and Mediterranean partners. The OSCE initiative 
has been loosing momentum with the passing of time, but the Seminars are regularly 
celebrated. 
In 1995, NATO made a proposal to the governments of Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and later to Algeria, to open direct Dialogue 
with a view to achieve better mutual understanding and foster the process of regional 
stabilization. The Dialogue focuses on civil issues, like exchange of information and 
technical assistance in the area of civil emergency planning, but develops also a military 
dimension which includes observation visits of officials of the Six non-NATO members 
to NATO exercises and military bodies, exchange of staff officers and port visits to 
Dialogue Countries by NATO’s naval forces. Except for seminars, conferences and 
other information sessions, the dialogue has been strictly bilateral between NATO and 
the single dialogue country. The Iraqi war and Bush’s strategy of attention to North 
Africa have negatively influenced the NATO’s Mediterranean policy. However, it has 
not been formally closed.   15
The OSCE and NATO initiatives and the importance of the military 
presence of the United States in the Mediterranean area signal the need for taking into 
consideration the problem of including external actors in the negotiation on the 
Mediterranean security partnership. It is worth to remind that the European and East 
Asia/Pacific security partnerships demonstrate the importance of including external 
actors as partners of the regional security arrangement. The European Union had to pay 
more attention to the positive results that the convergence of the Euro-Mediterranean 
project with other multilateral initiatives could produce. A EU-NATO-OSCE-
Mediterranean conference could provide a good start for intensifying co-operation in the 
region. Such a conference was suggested by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the last 
annual OSCE Conference on Security Policy in Munich (February 11, 2004). The 
construction of the Mediterranean security system will become more probable if the 
existing multilateral initiatives were coordinated, and also multilateral initiatives 
developed on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, i.e. among the Arabic countries of 
North Africa. 
 
Comparison and conclusions 
The current state of the four regional systems that, to a different extent, fit 
into the security partnership model is presented in Table 1. The table is a matrix for 
confronting the four cases and also a checklist for assessing the state of the 
Mediterranean project. In comparison with the other cases, the Mediterranean looks 
what it really is, i.e. a potential rather than a real case of security partnership building. 
On the whole, it is also on the back of the Shanghai system. The governments of the 
SCO created a Secretariat and Anti-terrorism Office, so demonstrating their will to enter 
into a true process of regional security building by providing the region with operative 
mechanisms.. 
 
Table 1: A comparison of the four regional security partnerships 
  European 
security 
system 
Asian 
Regional 
Forum 
Shanghai 
Security 
Organization 
Mediterranean 
security system 
Pre-conditions   
•  awareness for 
interdependence and global 
problems 
high high  high  high   16
•  restrained use of 
violence and relaxed or no 
power competition 
high high  high 
medium/low in 
general but 
absent in the 
M.E. 
Conditions        
•  consensus on reducing 
international violence, 
improving international and 
domestic stability, and 
promoting peace and 
economic growth 
high medium/  high medium  medium/low 
•  no system of opposite 
military alliances 
yes yes  yes  yes 
Structures and means   
•  written fundamental 
agreement 
yes yes  yes  yes 
•  operative agreements 
and multilateral offices 
many some  few  no 
•  international and internal 
measures and mechanisms 
for conflict management and 
prevention 
many  few 
(international)
one 
(anti-terrorism)  no 
•  involvement of extra-
regional powers 
yes yes  no  no 
Consequences   
•  reduction of security 
culture difference 
yes probable  probable uncertain 
•  increase of defence de-
nationalization 
to some 
extent  no no  no 
•  development of security 
community 
possible uncertain uncertain  uncertain 
 
All the regions but the Mediterranean one have similar attributes concerning 
the “pre-conditions” of security partnership. In fact, the building of the security 
partnership in the Mediterranean lacks the pre-condition of the restrained use of 
violence because conflict and war ravage the Middle East. However, should all “pre-
conditions” be fulfilled in the Mediterranean, the governments of the region had to give 
unequivocal demonstration of their commitment to the “consensus” condition which 
includes consensus on stability in the domestic domain. In other words, the countries of 
North Africa have to go down the road of liberalization and democracy without 
hesitation. 
Furthermore, apart from signing the Barcelona Declaration and repeatedly 
pledging, in numerous documents, to give execution and implementation to the 
fundamental objective of making the Mediterranean a zone of peace and stability that is 
solemnly declared in that founding document, for ten years the partner governments   17
have been unable to form any agreement on the structures and means of the regional 
security arrangement. No operative agreement has been signed so far. No mechanism 
and office for violence prevention and peaceful conflict resolution has been created. No 
discussion has been started for amalgamating the different “security dialogues” that are 
currently practiced in the region and consequently introduce that means that proved to 
be essential in the two most advanced cases of security partnership (the European and 
East Asia/Pacific cases), that is the enlargement of the negotiation to all relevant actors, 
including external actors like Russia and the United States. 
Forecasting the consequences of the current state of the four processes, one 
can be confident on the positive impact of the existing structures and means of security 
cooperation in Europe, and moderately confident on the future impact of the process in 
East Asia/Pacific and Central Asia, especially on the security cultures of the countries of 
the regions. But uncertainty prevails on these expectations with respect to the 
Mediterranean region. 
Since the present trends of the European and Arab security cultures are 
different from one another, the Euro-Mediterranean partners have been able to achieve a 
broad consensus on security cooperation, but great difficulties exist against the creation 
of operative instruments of security partnership. Reliance on the discussions of the 
network of diplomats and security experts, however, can help to approach the 
convergence of the security cultures and, hopefully, find out the measures of 
partnership-building that best fit to the expectations and values of all the parties. 
Finally, it is stressed again that policy-makers have to pay more attention to the 
evidence provided by the comparative analysis of regional security building, that is to 
say to the enlargement of the negotiating table. The chance of positive results of the 
Mediterranean security building process will be enhanced in as much as all relevant 
actors take part in the negotiation. This condition can be reached in the Mediterranean 
by opening formal discussions among the existing multilateral initiatives, that is the 
OSCE Mediterranean Initiative, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the Euro-
Mediterranean process, and also the Arab multinational initiatives that are very much 
whished for to come. 
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